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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, trial attorneys face an array of challenges resulting
1
from the proliferation of electronic evidence. The volume of
electronic evidence continues to mushroom as individuals increase
e-mail usage as a means of communication in lieu of the
2
telephone. Further, studies have shown a rapid increase in the
† J.D. Candidate 2005, William Mitchell College of Law; M.B.A., University
of Wisconsin, Madison, 1989; B.S., Finance, Real Estate & Insurance, Minnesota
State University, Mankato, cum laude, 1986.
1. David H. Schultz & J. Robert Keena, Discovery Challenges in the Electronic
Age, 24 PA. LAW. 24, 24 (Sept.-Oct. 2002); see also 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2218, at
450 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that computers and electronic media store a large
amount of information that is subject to litigation).
2. Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal
Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 328 (2000); see Grace
V. Bacon, The Fundamentals of Electronic Discovery, 47 B. B. J. 18, 18 (Mar./Apr.
2003) (citing Wired Media (Dec. 27, 2002), at http://www.wiredmedia.co.uk/
news_full.asp?IDW297 (stating that approximately 31 billion e-mail messages were
sent each day in 2002)); see also Ronald Raether, E-Mail Maelstrom, 13-Oct. BUS. L.
TODAY 57, 57 (Sept./Oct. 2003) (estimating generation of more than 17.5 trillion
electronic documents annually by 2005); META GROUP RESEARCH TREND, CONTENT
AND COLLABORATION RESEARCH TRENDS FOR 2003/2004, at http://www.
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revenue generated by consumer Internet purchases. Currently,
electronic evidence comprises between thirty and seventy percent
4
of all evidence in litigation matters.
As organizations and
individuals continue to implement advanced technologies,
5
litigation
discovery
complications
will
only
increase.
Technological advances not only simplify our daily lives, but also
6
create data trails subject to electronic discovery.
Compared with paper documents, electronic documents are
7
much more difficult to destroy. Once a document moves from a
creator’s computer to a network server, a backup system makes a
8
A common
copy and can store the document indefinitely.
misunderstanding is that once a user deletes an e-mail or a
document from his or her personal computer, the e-mail or
9
document cannot be recovered. However, advances in technology
increase the likelihood that a shredded paper document or deleted
10
e-mail is available on a backup system somewhere.
In framing a case, trial attorneys often seek to find the
11
“smoking gun” in electronic form. E-mail increasingly provides

metagroup.com/cgi-bin/inetcgi/jsp/displayArticle.do?oid=42394 (stating that
“[t]hrough 2007, rising electronic communication volumes will frustrate users
coping with information overload.”) (copy on file with author).
3. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 2, at 328 (stating that in 1996
consumer purchases over the Internet totaled approximately $289 million and
rose to $26 billion in 2001); see also Linda Rosencrance, Report: Online holiday
shopping up 35% from 2002, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 6, 2004), available at http:
//www.computerworld.com/managementtopics/ebusiness/story/0,10801,88789,0
0.html?SKC=ebusiness-88789 (last visited March 20, 2004) (stating that during the
2003 holiday season alone, consumers spent $18.5 billion, increasing 35% over the
$13.7 billion spent during the 2002 holiday season).
4. Compare J. Robert Keena, E-Discovery: Unearthing Documents Byte by Byte, 59
BENCH & B. MINN. 25, 25 (Mar. 2002) (stating that as much as thirty percent of all
evidence is maintained in electronic form) with Schultz & Kenna, supra note 1, at
27 (stating that seventy percent of all data is presently stored in electronic form).
5. Schultz & Kenna, supra note 1, at 27.
6. Id.
7. David Cearley et al., Enron Investigation Shows Importance of Proper Document
Archive and Destruction Practices, META Group News Analysis (Feb. 11, 2002), at http:
//www.metagroup.com/cgi-bin/inetcgi/jsp/displayArticle.do?oid=29234
(last
visited March 20, 2004) (discussing how investigators in the Enron case searched
server backup tapes for electronic records to recover copies of documents
reportedly shredded by Arthur Andersen) (copy on file with author).
8. Id.
9. Mary Kay Brown & Paul D. Weiner, Digital Dangers: A Primer on Electronic
Evidence in the Wake of Enron, 74 PA. B. ASS’N. Q. 1, 3 (Jan. 2003).
10. Cearley et al., supra note 7, at 1.
11. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 2, at 329.
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the crucial piece of information that determines the outcome of a
12
Given the importance of discovery in litigation, coupled
case.
with the increased use of computers to generate information,
courts will most likely see a rise in the number of discovery disputes
13
resulting from electronic discovery.
This comment begins by exploring the federal rules relevant to
14
discovery of electronic evidence. Section three introduces issues
resulting from advances in technology and the 1970 amendment to
15
Rule 34(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).
Section three also studies examples of how district courts in the
Eighth Circuit have resolved electronic discovery disputes involving
the manner and means of accessing information, discovery cost
16
issues, and accusations of lost or destroyed information. Courts,
including the Eighth Circuit, apply discretion when determining
17
how to resolve electronic discovery disputes.
The comment
suggests that until courts adopt guidelines for managing electronic
discovery disputes or the rule drafters amend the federal rules to
encompass electronic discovery issues, attorneys will be left
18
guessing how courts might resolve the disputes. Until that day,
attorneys should remain cognizant that case-specific details will
19
guide the court’s use of discretion.
II. FEDERAL RULES GOVERNING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
One purpose of the federal rules governing discovery is to
20
Although discovery rules are intended to
promote efficiency.
facilitate an orderly and cost-effective discovery process between
the parties, courts are still called upon to provide guidance and
21
control.
Courts step in to help resolve disputes involving
electronic discovery issues because the pertinent discovery rules do
not adequately address problems created by the discovery of
12. Id.
13. Id. at 341.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part III.A-C.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating the rules “shall be construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action”).
21. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 21.42 (1995).
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22

electronic information.
In 1970, FRCP 34(a) was amended to address issues brought
23
about by the advent of the computer age. Originally, Rule 34(a)
simply permitted a party to request production of documents or
24
The 1970 amendment to Rule 34(a) defined
tangible things.
documents as including other “data compilations from which
information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the
respondent through detection devices into reasonably usable
25
form.” This inclusive definition of documents reflected changing
26
technology.
Rule 34(a) permits discovery of documentary information
stored on computers whether on hard disk, back-up tapes, or other
27
peripheral devices. Further, the Advisory Committee Notes state
that the 1970 Amendment to Rule 34(a) applies to “electronic data
compilations from which information can be obtained only with
28
the use of detection devices . . . .”
Practitioners accept that Rule 34 allows discovery of
29
information stored on a computer. However, Rule 34 does not
address issues related to the manner and means for such
30
information disclosure. As a result, the discovery burden in terms
22. See Jason Krause, E-Discovery Order Changing the Rules, Federal Decision Deals
with Who Pays the Costs, 22 A.B.A. J. E-REP. 1 (June 6, 2003) (noting that pre-trial
discovery motions are usually invisible but a complicated question for courts is
how to handle the mountains of electronic evidence that are available for
discovery); see also Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 2, at 346-51 (concluding that
Rule 34 has shortcomings and noting that courts may not be able to address new
issues resulting from electronic discovery under Rule 34).
23. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 2218, at 450.
24. See id. § 2201, at 352. The original Rule 34(a) provided the following:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefore and upon
notice to all other parties, the court . . . may order any party to
produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing by
or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible
things . . . .
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (1968) (amended 1970).
25. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 2218, at 450.
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note.
27. See ROGER S. HAYDOCK & DAVID F. HERR, DISCOVERY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND
PROBLEMS § 4.16 (1983) [hereinafter DISCOVERY: THEORY, PRACTICE & PROBLEMS]
(stating that documentary information, whether stored on punched data cards,
electronic disks, or computer banks, is discoverable).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note.
29. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 2218, at 451.
30. DISCOVERY: THEORY, PRACTICE & PROBLEMS, supra note 27, § 4.16; see FED.
R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note (“[I]f the discovering party needs to
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of discovery scope and cost is placed on the party responding to a
31
discovery request.
FRCP Rule 26 operates to relieve the discovery burden placed
upon the responding party by prohibiting cumulative or duplicative
32
discovery requests.
Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery of matters
that are “relevant to the claim or defense” as long as “the discovery
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
33
evidence.” Although the discovery scope under Rule 26 appears
34
quite broad, it does provide an inherent proportionality test. Rule
26 requires consideration of the burden of producing the
information along with the potential benefit of the requested
information to determine whether information must be
35
produced. Therefore, even in complex litigation, discovery does
36
not warrant uncovering every piece of evidence.
Rule 26 does not, however, directly provide guidance
regarding how much information a party should produce, or which
37
party should bear the expense of costly electronic discovery.
Because of the void in Rule 26, practitioners predict the number of
38
electronic discovery disputes will surge.
This comment draws
attention to a deficiency in the federal rules in terms of a general
39
inability to manage electronic discovery problems.
Today,
complicated questions commonly arise when discovery involves a
40
Case law continues to
request for computerized information.
check the electronic source itself, the court may protect respondent with respect
to . . . confidentiality of nondiscoverable matters.”).
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note.
32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(i) (stating the court shall limit discovery if it
determines that “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,
or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive”).
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(i).
35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii) (stating a court can limit discovery when
“the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”).
36. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 21.41 (1995).
37. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C., 216 F.R.D. 280, 283-84 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (providing a seven-factor guideline to help determine which party should
bear the cost of electronic discovery); Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency,
Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, No. 98 Civ.8272(RPP) 2002 WL
975713 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2002) (providing an eight-factor guideline to help
determine which party should bear the cost of electronic discovery).
38. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 2, at 341.
39. See infra Part III.
40. 1A DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES:
CIVIL RULES ANNOTATED, § 34.12, at 191 (4th ed. 2002); see also Schultz & Keena,
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guide how parties should address the issue of the manner and
41
means for disclosure of computerized information.
III. ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE DISPUTES:
HOW DO THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURTS DECIDE THE ISSUES?
Use of electronic evidence presents challenges for litigators
and courts not only in terms of the manner and means of accessing
42
the information, but also in terms of which party should bear the
43
44
cost of electronic discovery, where to look for the information,
45
and spoliation of evidence. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
leave the decisions regarding procedures for discovering electronic
46
evidence to the courts.
The outcomes of electronic discovery
supra note 1, at 27 (stating that “technological developments . . . create trails of
data complicating legal discovery”).
41. HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 40, § 34.12, at 191. Cf. Scheindlin & Rabkin,
supra note 2, at 381-82 (noting that the time is right for the legal community to
focus on nationwide use of technology and the need for amendments to the
existing rules to provide decisional law addressing the special properties of
information technology).
42. DISCOVERY: THEORY, PRACTICE & PROBLEMS, supra note 27, § 4.16.
43. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (noting
the district court must exercise its discretion in deciding which party should incur
the cost of complying with a discovery order); see also Brown & Weiner, supra note
9, at 14 (noting that courts are adopting new approaches to determine which party
should bear the expense of electronic discovery and that the McPeek court
reviewed cases that involved cost shifting and characterized the cases as
“idiosyncratic and provid[ing] little guidance”) (citing McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202
F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2001)).
44. Bacon, supra note 2, at 19.
45. See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE
L.J. 561, 619 (2001) (defining spoliation as “a litigant’s destruction of evidence
that is either relevant to the litigation or reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence, in violation of a duty to preserve that evidence”)
(citing Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *11 (Mass.
App. Ct. June 16, 1999)); see also Ian C. Ballon, How Companies Can Reduce the Costs
and Risks Associated with Electronic Discovery, 15 No. 7 COMPUTER LAW. 8, 9 (July
1998) (describing spoliation as “the destruction or significant alteration of
evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence, in
pending or future litigation”).
46. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note (stating in many
instances respondent will need to supply a printout of computer data, and the
burden placed on respondent will vary from case to case); see also Oppenheimer
Fund, 437 U.S. at 358 (noting the district court must exercise its discretion in
deciding which party should incur the cost of complying with a discovery order);
Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652-54 (D. Minn. 2002)
(discussing procedures previously used by parties in other cases when resurrecting
data, and outlining how the plaintiff should proceed in resurrecting electronic
data); Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 2, at 381-82 (noting the “specter of
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47

disputes in the Eighth Circuit courts are unpredictable because
48
courts apply discretion in resolving the disputes.
A. Access to Electronic Evidence
49

Computer systems vary from one organization to another.
Consequently, questions arise regarding the most efficient means
50
of accessing computerized information. A leading case to address
whether the responding party must make the computerized
information available in a computer-readable format is National
51
Union Electric Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
In the context of the manner and means of accessing
electronic evidence, an Eighth Circuit court, in Antioch Co. v.
52
Scrapbook Borders, Inc., referred to other circuits for guidance. In
Antioch, the court addressed the issue of whether to grant a motion
to expedite discovery of computer equipment to investigate the
53
electronic content. The plaintiff moved to expedite discovery out
of a concern that the defendants might destroy documents relevant

immense confusion” inherent in electronic discovery and the need for
amendments to discovery rules to effectively govern electronic discovery).
47. While the Eighth Circuit has yet to address the issue, as discussed in this
article, various district courts within the Eighth Circuit have resolved electronic
discovery disputes in a reactive manner, on a case-by-case basis.
48. See Toghiyany v. AmeriGas Propane, Inc., 309 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir.
2002) (applying discretion in determining which party should bear the cost of
electronic discovery); Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 652-53 (applying compromise from
two previous district court decisions in the Seventh and Ninth circuits in
determining how to direct parties to resurrect data); Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F.
Supp. 2d 950, 954-56 (D. Minn. 1999) (applying discretion in awarding sanctions).
49. Cf. Matt Cain, E-Mail Off and On the Record: Part 1, META Group
Research—Delta Summary (Oct. 16, 2002), at http://www.metagroup.com/cgibin/inetcgi/jsp/displayArticle.do?oid=33595 (last visited March 20, 2004)
(discussing e-mail storage requirements and noting the multitude of e-mail
archival systems) (copy on file with author).
50. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 2218, at 452-53 (noting that initial
disclosures discussed during the Rule 26(f) conference can facilitate the process of
identifying the most efficient means of access to computerized information).
51 See id. § 2218, at 451-52 (citing Nat’l Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257 (D.C. Pa. 1980) (referencing defendants’ request
that plaintiff provide a computer tape of information previously provided in a
computer printout because of the extensive time required for inputting the
information into a computer for analysis purposes)).
52 See Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 652-54 (applying compromise from two previous
district court decisions in the Seventh and Ninth circuits regarding the process for
resurrecting data from respondent’s computers).
53. Id. at 650.
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54

to the litigation. In addition, the plaintiff requested that the court
55
appoint a neutral computer forensics expert.
The plaintiff believed that the defendants’ continued use of a
computer, where data remained on the computer’s hard drive,
56
would overwrite the data and make the data irretrievable.
Further, because the data contained product development data
and the parties were direct competitors, the plaintiff requested that
a computer forensics expert retrieve the stored data to ensure
57
recovery and preservation of the information.
Although the
defendants opposed the motions because the parties had not held
a Rule 26(f) discovery conference, the court granted the plaintiff’s
58
motions.
In reaching its conclusion, the Antioch court noted that even
though the parties had not held a Rule 26(f) discovery conference,
discovery should commence in order to ensure preservation of
59
computer records. The court noted that by allowing discovery to
commence earlier than usual, the parties would still have the same
amount of time to respond to discovery as allowed by the federal
60
rules. Finally, when granting the plaintiff’s motion for the court
to appoint a computer forensics expert, the Antioch court
referenced cases from courts within the Seventh and Ninth circuits
when outlining the manner and means to recover the
61
information.
Specifically, the Antioch court allowed the plaintiff to select an
62
expert of its choice in the computer forensics field. Next, the
court ordered the defendants to make all of their computer
equipment available to the expert at the defendants’ place of

54.
55.

Id.
Id.; see also Dan Verton, Let the Pros Investigate Computer Crimes,
COMPUTERWORLD, (July 15, 2002), available at http://www.computerworld.com/
printthis/2002/0,4814,72659,00.html (last visited March 20, 2004) (defining
computer forensics as the “identification, extraction, preservation and
documentation of computer evidence that will stand up to legal challenges about
its authenticity, accuracy and integrity”).
56. Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 650-51.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 651-53.
59. Id. at 651.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 652-53 (referencing Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc.,
194 F.R.D. 639, 640 (S.D. Ind. 2000) and Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F.
Supp. 2d 1050, 1053 (S.D. Cal. 1999)).
62. Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 653.
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63

business at a mutually agreeable time. Further, the expert was to
use best efforts to avoid any unnecessary disruptions to the
64
defendants’ business activities. The court directed the parties to
determine an appropriate time for the expert to access the
defendants’ computer equipment bearing in mind the interest in
minimizing the burden and inconvenience caused to the
65
defendants.
Regarding confidentiality, the court specified: (1)
the expert was to avoid inconveniencing the defendant, “up to and
including the retention of computer equipment on defendants’
premises[,]” (2) the only people authorized to access the
equipment were the expert and employees of the expert, and (3)
the expert was to maintain all information in the strictest
66
confidence.
The Antioch court’s order involved a complex sequence of
events, beginning with the computer forensics expert issuing a
report to the parties detailing the actions he took with regard to
67
each piece of equipment the defendants produced. In addition,
the computer expert was to produce two copies of the resulting
data and transmit one copy of the data to the court and the other
68
to the defendants. The defendants would then sift through the
data produced by the expert to locate any relevant documents and
69
provide them to the plaintiff along with a privilege log.
The court built into its order a method of resolving any
disputes that might arise under this system. In the event the
plaintiff disputed an allegedly privileged claim, or claimed the
existence of additional relevant documents, the court would
70
conduct an in-camera review. Unless modified by another court,
the procedure outlined by the court would govern the information
71
recovery process.
Antioch illustrates how specific facts, rather than a general
guideline, lead a court to resolve issues that arise in dealing with
electronic information.
At its most basic level, Antioch
63. Id.
64. Id. A privilege log would describe the nature of any privileged documents
and allow the plaintiff to assess the applicability of the privilege claimed. Id. at
653-54.
65. Id. at 654.
66. Id. at 653.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 654.
71. Id.
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demonstrates that accessing electronic information is not as simple
as providing a paper document to the other party. At the time of
the decision, the absence of clear guidelines detailing how to
manage access to electronic information led the court to outline an
extensive process based on the case-specific facts. Although further
discovery disputes were not reported in Antioch, additional case
analysis illustrates that problems continue to loom when parties
72
request electronic information.
B. Electronic Discovery Cost Disputes
The increased cost of discovery, always an important
consideration, is a second issue resulting from increased use of
73
computerized information. Typical paper discovery requires the
producing party to bear the financial expense of producing
74
documents. A party may encounter an undue cost burden when
attempting to produce computerized information in response to a
75
request for such information. Courts, however, retain discretion
to shift the expense to the other party when it is unduly
76
burdensome. As a result, attorneys are often left to guess how the
72. See infra Part III.B-C (analyzing the Eighth Circuit courts’ resolution of
electronic discovery disputes in additional matters).
73. See JAY E. GRENIG & JEFFREY S. KINSLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL CIVIL
DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE, § 13.12 (2d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2003) (discussing the
cost of producing computerized information); see also Brown & Weiner, supra note
9, at 14 (noting the significant costs associated with electronic discovery); Peter
Brown, Discovery and Use of Electronic Evidence, 734 PRACTICING L. INST. 391, 398
(2003) (noting that costs increase significantly when special equipment or
programming expertise is needed to extract electronic data from outmoded
technology formats).
74. See GRENIG & KINSLER, supra note 73, § 13.12 (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 1, § 2218) (stating a responding party ordinarily bears the cost of producing
information in cases where the responding party is required to provide a print-out
or otherwise make the information reasonably usable); see also Krause, supra note
22, at 1 (noting that in the world of paper discovery, it is widely assumed that the
producing party bears the burden of producing documents).
75. See GRENIG & KINSLER, supra note 73, § 13.12. (citations omitted) (noting
the cost of producing information may be an issue when requested e-mail or voicemail messages have been erased from a hard disk but the party is capable of
retrieving the information using sophisticated means).
76. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (noting
the district court can exercise its discretion in deciding which party should incur
the cost of complying with a discovery order); Bacon, supra note 2, at 21 (noting
that courts sometimes require the requesting party to pay the cost of electronic
discovery and at other times require the parties split the cost of electronic
discovery) (citing Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., No. 98
Civ.8272, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8308, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2002); Byers v. Illinois
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77

court will manage discovery cost issues. In addition, courts also
78
retain discretion to restrict the extent of discovery.
1. Court’s Use of Discretion
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas addressed a discovery cost issue in Concord Boat Corp. v.
79
Brunswick Corp. In Concord, Brunswick objected to the plaintiff’s
motion to compel discovery of electronically stored information on
80
the grounds that it would result in “unbearable expense.” The
plaintiff’s motion requested the following:
[A]ll electronic mail . . . files, including all current and
backed-up versions of the files . . . . [A]ll versions, electronic
and otherwise, of up to 1,000 documents . . . . [F]or
Brunswick’s marine-related divisions and headquarters to
identify, restore and produce all deleted and destroyed documents
on their computer systems for the last five years . . . .
[And] to . . . search . . . each computer at each Brunswick
81
location.
In response, Brunswick argued that to comply with the
plaintiff’s demands would result in not only “unbearable expense
and interruption in conducting its business,” but also that it would
82
be impossible to comply with the request.
The court’s solution was to order the parties to propose
solutions regarding the request for e-mail files for discussion at a
83
telephone conference. The court then stated that the plaintiff
should specifically identify which of the 1000 requested documents
84
should be produced and why they should be produced. Further,
State Police, No. 99-C-8105, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9861, at *35-37 (N.D. Ill. May 31,
2002); In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437 (D. N.J. 2002)).
77. See Brown, supra note 73, at 398 (noting that “courts have not settled
which party should ultimately bear the costs of electronic document production”).
Some courts apply the traditional approach that companies using varied
technologies assume the risks of discovery costs. See id. at 399 (noting that one
court recently attempted to formulate an eight-point set of guidelines to
determine how to distribute electronic discovery costs) (citing Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v.
William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note.
79. Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1996 WL
33347247, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 1996).
80. Id.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Id. at *3.
84. Id.
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the court denied the plaintiff’s request for restoration of all deleted
and destroyed documents on Brunswick’s computer systems on the
85
grounds that the request appeared unduly burdensome.
The
court deferred its decision regarding what current electronic data
86
Instead, the
of Brunswick should be extracted and produced.
court ordered Brunswick to provide a detailed description of all
electronically stored information it maintained to the court and to
87
the plaintiff.
The court’s decision to grant the motion in part, deny it in
part, and defer it in part illustrates the merit of both parties’
88
positions.
On the one hand, the court acknowledged the
plaintiff’s concern that Brunswick’s initial document and
89
information search was incomplete. On the other hand, the court
90
acknowledged that Brunswick conducted a careful search.
However, the court noted, “[a]n all-encompassing search of all
files, including e-mail, location of early versions of 1,000 files[,] and
restoration of all documents deleted in the last five years would
91
clearly be extremely burdensome.”
92
In a
The discovery dispute in Concord did not end here.
subsequent proceeding, the plaintiff again moved to compel
93
production of e-mail. This time, the plaintiff requested that the
court order Brunswick to produce all e-mail in its computer
94
The request for discovery of all of Brunswick’s e-mail
system.
95
encompassed two separate e-mail systems.
Brunswick’s issue in
complying with the plaintiff’s production request was that e-mail
recovery from the older e-mail system would require searching
96
backup tapes.
Further, to avoid disrupting Brunswick’s
85. Id.
86. Id. at *4.
87. Id. at *4-5.
88. See id. at *2 (noting “[t]here is merit to both sides’ positions”).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL
33352759, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997) (stating that over the last year, the
parties had attempted to resolve numerous issues regarding electronic
information).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. (noting that when the present action commenced, defendant
utilized an e-mail system named “Fisher” and subsequently that defendant began
utilizing the Lotus Notes e-mail system).
96. Id. at *8-9.
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continuing data-processing activities, Brunswick would need to
duplicate its computing environment at the time of creation of the
97
backup tape.
The court recognized the significant cost implications that
98
The court also noted that the
would result from this request.
potential gains were questionable because of the limited number of
99
backup tapes available. Consequently, the court did not require
100
The
Brunswick to produce e-mail from the older e-mail system.
court did, however, order Brunswick to search its existing e-mail
101
system for relevant e-mail.
Concord provides a good illustration of how courts wrestle with
electronic discovery cost issues. Courts analyze specific facts to
reach a conclusion, without relying on procedural rules,
demonstrating to practitioners that courts use discretion in
resolving electronic discovery disputes. However, although the
court weighed cost implications against potential information
gains, the Concord case is not proactive because it fails to provide a
clear set of guidelines regarding how courts will manage future
electronic discovery disputes.
2. Broad Discovery Request Results in Denial of Motion to Compel
Discovery
102

In Toghiyany v. AmeriGas Propane, Inc., the Eighth Circuit
103
Court of Appeals considered a motion to compel discovery. The
plaintiff in Toghiyany appealed a decision by the district court
104
denying the plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery of e-mail. The
appellate court reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to
105
compel discovery for gross abuse of discretion.
The plaintiff’s request for production included “any and all e106
The defendant
mails concerning [p]laintiff . . . or his business.”
argued that the plaintiff’s request was “overbroad and unduly
97. Id. at *9.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 309 F.3d 1088, 1090 (8th Cir. 2002).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1093.
105. Id. (citing Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1040 (8th Cir. 1997)).
106. Brief for Appellant at 45 n.1, Toghiyany v. AmeriGas Propane, Inc., 309
F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-1283).
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107

burdensome.”
The defendant presented evidence in support of
this argument, illustrating that to comply with the plaintiff’s
request it would take 1758 hours of a technical professional’s time
and approximately $31,505 worth of computer equipment to
108
restore and review the e-mail messages requested. The defendant
even offered to make arrangements to comply with the plaintiff’s
request if the plaintiff would agree to pay for the technical
109
professional’s time and the equipment.
The plaintiff did not
110
respond to the defendant’s offer
and the district court
111
subsequently denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court erred by
112
not providing any reasons for the denial.
The plaintiff asserted
that to determine whether a discovery request is unduly
burdensome, the court should weigh the benefit and burden of
113
discovery.
In response, the defendant argued that the court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel because
the plaintiff did not provide sufficient support to overcome the
114
defendant’s objection to the motion.
The defendant noted that the plaintiff’s request would have
required it to scour “thousands of archived e-mails from backup
tapes, of which only a tiny fraction involved the relevant employees’
115
e-mails.” In an effort to show the court the complexities involved
in complying with the plaintiff’s request, the defendant provided
the court with links to two web sites detailing the archived file
116
recovery process. In response, the plaintiff asserted that it was an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to not inquire into the
117
feasibility of the defendant recovering a few select e-mails.
The
appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision denying the
118
plaintiff’s motion to compel.
Toghiyany provides an example of how a court can manage
107. Brief for Appellee at 16, Toghiyany (No. 02-1283).
108. Id. at 54.
109. Id. at 54 n.11.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1.
112. Brief for Appellant at 47, Toghiyany (No. 02-1283).
113. Id. at 46 (citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 105354 (S.D. Cal. 1999)).
114. Brief for Appellee at 53, Toghiyany (No. 02-1283).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 54.
117. Reply Brief for Appellant at 20, Toghiyany (No. 02-1283).
118. Toghiyany, 309 F.3d at 1093.
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electronic discovery cost issues by simply denying a motion to
compel discovery.
The plaintiff’s unresponsiveness to the
defendant’s offer to comply with the request on the condition that
the plaintiff incur the cost of recovery may logically have
influenced the appellate court’s decision. Nevertheless, Toghiyany
illustrates that when a party’s request is overly broad or irrelevant, a
court may completely deny recovery of information, not simply
limit recovery to what is reasonable and cost effective.
3.

Zubulake: Second Circuit Court Guideline

Recently, a decision from the Southern District of New York
addressed the question of how to determine which party should pay
119
for electronic discovery. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. involved
allegations of employment discrimination, including gender
120
discrimination, failure to promote, and retaliation.
To support
her claim, the plaintiff-employee requested evidence stored on the
defendants-employers’ backup tapes that was available only
121
through a costly and time-consuming data retrieval process. The
issue for the court was which party should bear the cost of restoring
122
and producing the backup tapes.
Initially, to provide a framework for the court’s cost-shifting
analysis, the judge ordered the defendants to restore and produce
e-mail from five of the ninety-four backup tapes that the defendants
123
identified as containing relevant documents.
The defendants
124
The
hired an outside vendor to perform the data restoration.
125
plaintiff selected the backup tapes that she wanted restored. The
outside vendor was required not only to restore the identified
tapes, but also to search through the restored e-mails for identified
126
subject information such as the plaintiff’s name or initials.
In
return for the outside vendor’s services, the vendor billed the

119. Zubulake v. USB Warburg L.L.C., 216 F.R.D. 280, 281-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
120. Id. at 281.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 282.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. As an illustration of the amount of electronic information available
with this type of request, the backup tapes corresponded to five months of e-mail
sent to or from the plaintiff’s immediate supervisor. Id. at 281-82. The outside
vendor restored the information and the restoration yielded a total of 8344 emails. Id. at 282.
126. Id.
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127

defendants $11,524.63.
The vendor’s bill included both the
128
In
restoration services and the use of its computer systems.
addition to the outside vendor costs, the defendants incurred legal
129
fees for document review production.
Consequently, the total
130
cost incurred in restoring five backup tapes was $19,003.43.
Faced with escalating discovery costs, the defendants asked the
131
court to shift any further production costs to the plaintiff. Based
on the initial cost of restoring the five tapes, the defendants
estimated that the total cost of restoring the requested documents
132
would equal approximately $273,600.
The court commenced the analysis of a possible cost shift by
133
referencing general rules governing the discovery process.
In
particular, the court noted that FRCP 26(b)(2) provides a
134
proportionality test governing the permissibility of discovery.
135
The court cited Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders
for the
proposition that “ ‘the responding party must bear the expense of
complying with discovery requests,’ [and] requests that run afoul of
the Rule 26(b)(2) proportionality test may subject the requesting
party to protective orders under Rule 26(c), ‘including orders
conditioning discovery on the requesting party’s payment of the
136
costs of discovery.’ ”
Prior to identifying the factors used to determine the
appropriateness of cost shifting, the court noted that cost shifting is
137
potentially appropriate only when a party seeks inaccessible data.
The Zubulake court then identified a list of seven factors to
determine which party should pay for discovery of inaccessible
138
data:
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored
to discover relevant information; 2. The availability of
127. Id. at 283.
128. Id. at 282.
129. Id. at 283.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. (calculating an additional $165,954.67 to restore and search the
remaining backup tapes, and an additional $107,694.72 in attorney and paralegal
document review costs).
133. Id. at 283 (referencing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)-(2)).
134. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)).
135. 437 U.S. 340 (1978).
136. Zubulake, 216 F.R.D. at 283 (quoting Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 358).
137. Id. at 284.
138. Id.
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such information from other sources; 3. The total cost of
production, compared to the amount in controversy; 4.
The total cost of production, compared to the resources
available to each party; 5. The relative ability of each party
to control costs and its incentive to do so; 6. The
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and 7.
The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the
139
information.
Noting the concern of commentators regarding an eight-factor
test articulated in Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency,
140
141
The court
Inc., the Zubulake court modified the list of factors.
stated that the seven factors were “designed to simplify application
of the Rule 26(b)(2) proportionality test in the context of
142
electronic data . . . .”
The court noted that in the future courts should weigh the
143
factors in the order listed.
In particular, the court stated the
144
most weight should be given to factors one and two.
Nevertheless, the court reiterated, “a list of factors is not merely a
145
matter of counting and adding; it is only a guide.”
In Zubulake, the court concluded that the parties should share
146
the costs.
The court ordered the defendants to bear seventy-five
percent and the plaintiff twenty-five percent of the restoration
147
The court weighed the seven factors and found that some
costs.
139. Id.
140. 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 2002 WL 975713 (S.D.N.Y. May
9, 2002).
141. See Zubulake, 216 F.R.D. at 284 (quoting commentators that the Rowe
factors “tend to favor the responding party, and frequently result in shifting the
costs of electronic discovery to the requesting party”). The Rowe court suggested
consideration of the following eight factors before shifting costs to the requesting
party:
The specificity of the discovery requests . . . ; The likelihood of a
successful search . . . ; The availability of such information from other
sources . . . ; The purposes for which the responding party maintains
the requested data . . . ; The relative benefit to the parties of obtaining
the information . . . ; The total cost associated with production . . . ;
The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do
so . . . ; The resources available to each party . . . .
Brown & Weiner, supra note 9, at 15-16 (referencing Rowe, 205 F.R.D. 421
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) aff’d, 2002 WL 975713 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2002)).
142. Zubulake, 216 F.R.D. at 284.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 289.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 291.
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of the factors disfavored cost shifting, but only “slightly so.”
Further, the court reasoned that the success of the document
search was somewhat speculative; therefore, the plaintiff should
149
bear some of the costs.
The court concluded the “precise
allocation [of costs] is a matter of judgment and fairness rather
than a mathematical consequence of the seven factors discussed
150
above.”
By requiring the plaintiff to bear some of the costs, the
court concluded that the partial cost shift ensured the defendants’
cost would not be unduly burdensome, while also ensuring that it
151
would not chill the right of the plaintiff to pursue a claim.
Zubulake again provides an illustration of how courts apply
discretion when resolving discovery disputes. By identifying seven
factors, the court provides a general guideline for attorneys to
152
consider when faced with discovery cost issues.
In addition, by
applying more weight to specific factors, the court recognizes a
party’s effort in specifying its discovery needs. The court also
recognizes the importance of confining a discovery request to
relevant information that is unavailable from other sources. The
effect of the Zubulake court’s seven-factor test is twofold. First, it
provides relief to a party that receives an unduly burdensome
discovery request by providing rationale for the court to either shift
the cost to the requesting party, or to order the parties to share the
cost. Second, it rewards a party that carefully confines its discovery
request to relevant and otherwise unavailable information by
denying a responding party’s request to shift or share discovery
costs.
C. Evidence Spoliation
A final issue resulting from use of electronic evidence is
153
154
spoliation, which the federal rules do not directly address.
Success of the discovery process is dependant upon and

148. Id. at 289.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 284.
153. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
154. See Redish, supra note 46, at 628 n.212 (noting that “[a]lthough Rule
37(b)(2) authorizes sanctions for the failure to permit discovery, this authority
under the rules often has been construed to be confined to situations in which the
party destroyed evidence following issuance of a discovery order”).
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155

intertwined with spoliation issues.
Companies are taking
proactive measures to help ensure that if they receive a broad
discovery request, they will not need to search gigabytes of
156
information.
By effectively managing information, companies
can better determine what is and what is not relevant information
157
in response to a discovery request. Companies must nevertheless
remain cognizant of the fact that although they follow documentretention and document-management policies, they cannot destroy
158
documents when the documents are subject to litigation.
Under the spoliation of evidence doctrine, if a company has
not retained relevant documents, including computerized
information, a court may award the requesting party with a specific
159
jury instruction, or possibly entry of judgment.
Courts vary in
160
When spoliation
determining when spoliation actually occurs.
occurs is important because of the potential sanctions a court may
161
order in response to spoliation of evidence.
Courts view the
162
Parties can
selective destruction of documents with a wary eye.
nevertheless find some solace in the fact that courts do not penalize
parties when a party can demonstrate that document destruction
163
was done in good faith.

155. Id. at 619.
156. See Kenneth K. Dort & George R. Spatz, Discovery in the Digital Era:
Considerations for Corporate Counsel, 20 No. 9 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 11, 16-17
(Sept. 2003) (noting that companies are implementing document retention
policies and document management procedures to help streamline the
production process in the event of litigation).
157. Id. at 17.
158. Ballon, supra note 45, at 9-10.
159. See id. at 9 (stating that “spoliation of evidence may result in the entry of
judgment, an adverse inference[,] or merely an award of attorney’s fees,
depending on the severity and significance of the destruction to the case at bar
and the destroying party’s intent”).
160. See Redish, supra note 46, at 628 n.214 (contrasting a decision where the
court concluded spoliation cannot be found before the lawsuit commenced with a
decision where the court found a duty to preserve evidence arises when the party
possessing the evidence has notice of its relevance) (citing Giant Food Stores, Inc.
v. K-Mart Corp., No. 94-6817, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17831, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
4, 1996); Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72-73 (S.D.N.Y.
1991)).
161. Id. at 620.
162. Dort & Spatz, supra note 156, at 17 (citing Patrick Grady, Discovery of
Computer Stored Documents & Computer Based Litigation Support Systems: Why Give Up
More than Necessary?, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 523, 542 (1996)).
163. Id. (citing Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th
Cir. 1988)).
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1. Good Faith Required When Implementing a Record Retention
Policy
In Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., the Eighth Circuit
164
addressed spoliation of evidence under a record-retention policy.
At trial, the plaintiffs requested a jury instruction because
Remington was unable to produce several documents that were
165
destroyed under its record-retention policy.
On appeal,
Remington asserted that the district court erred by providing a jury
instruction that allowed the jury to find a negative inference when
166
a party could have produced a record but did not.
The court remanded the case to determine whether the jury
instruction was proper and instructed the trial court to consider
three factors before deciding to give the jury an instruction
167
regarding the failure to produce evidence.
The three factors
were: (1) whether a record-retention policy is reasonable
considering the facts and circumstances surrounding the relevant
documents; (2) whether lawsuits concerning the complaint or
related complaints have been filed, including the magnitude and
frequency of such complaints; and (3) whether the document168
retention policy was instituted in bad faith.
The court concluded that it may be proper to give an
instruction similar to the instruction requested by the plaintiffs
when a company institutes a document-retention policy in bad
169
faith.
In addition, the court noted that even if a documentretention policy did exist, a company might need to retain certain
170
The court bluntly stated that “a corporation cannot
documents.
blindly destroy documents and expect to be shielded by a
171
seemingly innocuous document retention policy.”
In addition to its three-factor test, Lewy demonstrates that if a
corporation implements a document-retention policy in bad faith,
164. Lewy, 836 F.2d 1104.
165. Id. at 1111.
166. See id. (instructing the jury that “[i]f a party fails to produce evidence
which is under his control and reasonably available to him and not reasonably
available to the adverse party, then you may infer that the evidence is unfavorable
to the party who could have produced it and did not”).
167. Id. at 1112.
168. Id. (citing Gumbs v. Int’l Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir. 1983)).
169. See Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1112 (stating that an adverse jury instruction may be
proper when a company institutes a document retention policy for the purpose of
limiting damaging evidence available to potential plaintiffs).
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Gumbs, 718 F.2d at 96).
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and it later finds itself involved in litigation, a court can sanction
the corporation by issuing a jury instruction permitting the jury to
form inferences adverse to the corporation. The underlying
premise from Lewy is that once faced with pending litigation, a
party must act in good faith to preserve and make available relevant
information.
2. Sanctions for Non-Compliance with Pretrial Discovery Orders
In Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, the District Court of Minnesota awarded
sanctions when the defendant did not comply with pretrial
172
The defendant left his job as an account
discovery orders.
manager with Lexis-Nexis and went to work for another online
173
information services organization.
When he left employment
with Lexis-Nexis, the defendant proceeded to copy a customercontact database and hundreds of Lexis-Nexis e-mails from his
Lexis-Nexis laptop and then transferred the information to his new
174
employer-supplied laptop.
The defendant also deleted what he
thought was outdated information from his Lexis-Nexis laptop, and
he threw away the disk that he used to transfer the database and e175
mail information.
When Lexis-Nexis learned that the defendant began working
with the new online services company, Lexis-Nexis demanded that
176
he return all Lexis-Nexis documents to the company. Lexis-Nexis
177
brought suit after the defendant did not respond to its request.
Subsequently, Lexis-Nexis motioned for expedited discovery and
178
The
filed its first set of requests for production of documents.
defendant confirmed that he would produce all non-privileged
179
responsive documents.
Throughout the expedited discovery process the parties
exchanged data that later turned out to be a reconstructed version
of the customer-contact database rather than the complete
180
In addition, the
database, which the court had ordered.
defendant confirmed that he deleted an earlier version of the
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F. Supp. 2d 950, 955 (D. Minn. 1999).
Id. at 952.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 952-53.
Id. at 953.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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181

database from his computer.
The defendant’s counsel then
attempted to make an image copy of the laptop’s hard drive, and in
doing so, defendant’s counsel inadvertently overwrote the
182
remnants of some previously deleted information.
Lexis-Nexis
sought the help of a computer-forensics expert to analyze the
183
deleted files from the defendant’s new laptop.
The expert
concluded that the defendant deleted a number of important
184
Subsequently, Lexis-Nexis motioned for
Lexis-Nexis documents.
185
sanctions against the defendant.
The court noted that under Rule 37(b)(2), when a party
violates a discovery order, the court “may make such orders in
186
regard to the failure as are just.”
Referencing Eighth Circuit
precedent, the court “stated that ‘[s]anctions may be imposed
against a litigant who is on notice that documents and information
in his possession are relevant to litigation, or potential litigation, or
are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
187
The
evidence, and destroys such documents and information.’ ”
court summarized that “sanctions are appropriate when a party (1)
destroys (2) discoverable material (3) which the party knew or
should have known (4) was relevant to pending, imminent, or
188
reasonably foreseeable litigation.”
The conflicting facts asserted by each party led the court to
conclude that Lexis-Nexis satisfied the last three elements of its
189
destruction-of-evidence claim.
However, Lexis-Nexis did not
convince the court on the most important element of the claim:
190
After Lexisthat the defendant destroyed relevant evidence.
Nexis filed its motion for sanctions, the parties discovered that the
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 953-54 (noting that the basis for Lexis-Nexis’ motion for
sanctions was that earlier the court issued a temporary restraining order against
the defendant in order to ensure that he would deliver the copy of the database
that he made to Lexis-Nexis and that he was not to retain a copy, and that
defendant destroyed evidence).
186. Id. at 954.
187. Id. (citing Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., 986 F.2d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455
(C.D. Cal. 1984)).
188. Id. (quoting JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION of EVIDENCE § 3.8, at
88 (1989)).
189. Id.
190. Id.
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documents, which the parties believed were deleted, were
191
inadvertently transferred to the defendant’s new laptop. Further,
the court noted that although the defendant’s counsel
inadvertently overwrote some data while making a copy of the
defendant’s hard drive, Lexis-Nexis did not demonstrate that any of
192
the lost data would have contained relevant information.
The
court then stated that even if it were to find that some of the
relevant information had not been overwritten, Lexis-Nexis failed
193
to demonstrate that the loss of evidence would prejudice its case.
In reaching its conclusion, the court stated that there was little
reason to believe that the lost information was substantially
194
different from that of the preserved information.
The court was
not willing to presume that the overwritten computer data
contained any more sensitive evidence than what Lexis-Nexis
195
hoped to find at the outset. Consequently, the court determined
that it would not draw any adverse inferences when evaluating
196
Lexis-Nexis’ request for a preliminary injunction.
Aside from the preliminary injunction motion, the court
concluded that the defendant’s conduct warranted monetary
197
198
sanctions.
Focusing on the defendant’s conduct and his delay
in revealing information to Lexis-Nexis, the court concluded that
the defendant’s actions “set off a high-tech wild goose chase that
199
has needlessly multiplied the time and expense of this litigation.”
The court reserved judgment regarding the size of the monetary
200
sanction because the litigation was still at an early stage. Wanting
a more complete factual picture to emerge before assessing fees
and costs, the court requested Lexis-Nexis to renew its motion at a
201
more appropriate time.
191. Id. at 954-55.
192. Id. at 955.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id. 955-56 (noting that Lexis-Nexis sought an injunction, asking the
court to order termination of the defendant’s employment with his new
employer).
197. Id. at 955.
198. See id. (noting the defendant created a new copy of the customer-contact
database rather than simply turning over the database as it existed at the time of
the hearing, and he copied the information after the court ordered him to not do
so).
199. Id. at 956.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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The Lexis-Nexis case provides a good illustration of how what
appears to be a simple discovery request can turn into a costly
discovery dispute. In its conclusion, the court even noted how the
defendant’s conduct unnecessarily multiplied the time and
202
expense involved in discovery. Lexis-Nexis clearly articulates what
a court will require of a party when it files a motion for discovery
sanctions on the premise of destruction of evidence. Lexis-Nexis
should further alert parties that even if the party motioning for
sanctions cannot prove all elements of its destruction-of-evidence
claim, including the most important element that the other party
actually destroyed relevant information, the court can use
discretion and award monetary sanctions if the party does not
follow the court’s instructions regarding electronic evidence
exactly.
IV. CONCLUSION
203

Technology continues to evolve. As a result, issues regarding
204
use of electronic evidence will only become more common.
Although one purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to
205
promote efficiency, case law illustrates that, at times, discovery
206
involving electronic information is far from efficient.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Larry Velez, Reliable Offshore Networking, META Group Research—
Delta (Aug. 28, 2003), at http://www.metagroup.com/cgi-bin/inetcgi/jsp/
displayArticle.do?oid=42510 (last visited March 20, 2004) (discussing information
technology offshore outsourcing and stating that “[w]ide-area network services will
transition toward IP/VPNs . . . .”) (copy on file with author); Earl Perkins & Steve
Kleynhans, Skipping Windows Generations: Migrating to Win2003, META Group
Research—Delta (Aug. 19, 2003), at http://www.metagroup.com/cgi-bin/inetcgi/
jsp/displayArticle.do?oid=42384 (last visited March 20, 2004) (discussing
corporate server operating system migration strategies and noting that the sunset
of Microsoft Windows NT support is leading some organizations to skip a
migration to Win2000 and instead organizations are migrating to Win2003) (copy
on file with author).
204. See Brown & Weiner, supra note 9, at 17 (“Computers and their progeny
are here to stay until technology advances beyond these limitations. Until then,
lawyers practicing in this digital age must appreciate their obligations with respect
to handling electronic evidence, including how to locate, preserve[,] and produce
such evidence . . . .”).
205. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
206. See Lexis-Nexis, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 956 (stating defendant complicated
matters and “set off a high-tech wild goose chase”); see also Scheindlin & Rabkin,
supra note 2, at 378 (asserting that trial courts’ resolution of electronic discovery
disputes results in a “patchwork of varying discovery ‘rules’ across the country” and
does not enhance the efficiency of electronic discovery).
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Today when a discovery dispute involves a request for either
electronic information that appears unduly burdensome, or where
the information is no longer available, decisions by district courts
in the Eighth Circuit provide little guidance regarding how it will
act. Parties should proceed through discovery by responding in
good faith to discovery requests. In addition, parties must act in
good faith to preserve relevant information that is or may be
subject to litigation. Nevertheless, practicing attorneys know that a
case will arise where one party will receive an unduly burdensome
request, or the attorney’s client has destroyed (possibly in good
faith) relevant information subject to litigation. When such
situations arise, courts will make decisions on an ad hoc basis and
at times courts may apply guidelines or tests that vary from one case
to the next.
As noted in Antioch, the court examines case-specific facts to
reach a decision regarding how to manage discovery of electronic
207
information. There is no evidence that the court, as compared to
the parties, is in a better position to understand the mechanics
involved in recovering archived information. Based on the
decision in Antioch, it appears that the court relies on guidance
208
from other courts to determine the course of action. In addition,
a detailed, well-articulated brief may help influence the court in
determining the course of action.
Consequently, attorneys
involved in electronic discovery disputes should take notice that a
carefully crafted brief may protect the client by ensuring the other
party produces relevant information, or by saving the client from
searching endlessly for unnecessary information.
Electronic discovery cost disputes are one of the most
troublesome areas where courts make decisions on an ad hoc basis.
Concord, Toghiyany, and Zubulake provide examples of how the
courts apply discretion when determining which party should bear
209
the cost of electronic discovery.
Aside from the seven-factor test
denoted by a court within the Second Circuit in Zubulake, attorneys
have very little guidance regarding how a court might decide which
party will bear the cost of electronic discovery. Because the federal
rules do not adequately address how to manage electronic
207. See Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 649-52 (D.
Minn. 2002).
208. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
209. See supra Part III.B (analyzing resolution of electronic discovery cost
disputes).
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discovery, the outcome of electronic discovery cost disputes is
unpredictable.
It is uncertain how the district courts within the Eighth Circuit
will reach a decision regarding electronic discovery costs. An
Eighth Circuit district court may adopt the seven-factor test
established in Zubulake, but even the Zubulake court noted that the
factors simply provide a guideline. Without adopting the Zubulake
seven-factor test, the Eighth Circuit district courts will most likely
continue to use discretion on a case-by-case basis, providing little
guidance for attorneys. By analyzing the facts of a case, rather than
establishing a general guideline, Eighth Circuit district courts that
encounter electronic discovery cost disputes will witness timeconsuming and expensive litigation.
The issue regarding evidence spoliation is one additional
electronic discovery issue where courts have flexibility and again
210
apply discretion in resolving the dispute.
Although parties strive
to manage information effectively so they are able to locate relevant
information when they receive an extensive discovery request for
documents, the parties must act in good faith to avoid inadvertent
destruction of relevant information. Destruction of relevant
211
information will result in sanctions.
Although courts act with discretion in applying sanctions for
destruction of evidence, Lewy and Lexis-Nexis illustrate that
sanctions can vary from an adverse jury instruction to monetary
212
sanctions.
In addition, in the event a party cannot prove
destruction of the evidence, a court may still impose monetary
213
sanctions.
Although attorneys know that a court will impose
sanctions for willful destruction of relevant documents, the courts’
use of discretion in determining the type of sanction to impose
again leaves attorneys guessing.
Antioch, Concord, Toghiyany, Zubulake, Lewy, and Lexis-Nexis all
illustrate how courts analyze electronic discovery disputes,
210. See supra Part III.C (discussing electronic evidence spoliation and the
range of possible sanctions).
211. Cf. Redish, supra note 45, at 620 (noting that the question regarding
evidence spoliation is one regarding what the appropriate sanction should be for
violating the duty of preservation).
212. Compare Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir.
1988) (stating that an adverse jury instruction may be proper when a company
implements a document-retention policy in bad faith) with Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41
F. Supp. 2d 950, 955 (D. Minn. 1999) (concluding that defendant’s conduct
warranted monetary sanctions).
213. Lexis-Nexis, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 954.
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regardless of the dispute subject, on a case-by-case basis. The result
is that attorneys do not have standard guidelines to operate within
when trying to resolve electronic discovery disputes. Instead, the
disputes encroach on already busy court schedules. The Eighth
Circuit courts, along with other circuits, appear poised to continue
their pattern of time-consuming, ad hoc decision making. Until
the federal rules adequately address electronic discovery, it appears
that no manageable solution producing predictable results is on
the horizon. Practitioners have suggested that modification of the
federal rules will correct the problems associated with electronic
214
discovery.
Quite possibly, the rule makers continue to let courts
set electronic discovery rules on an ad hoc basis because the rule
makers are unable to determine a more effective solution.

214. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 2, at 327, 381 (asserting that Rule 34
has shortcomings regarding how it addresses discovery of electronic information
and the need to adapt the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to electronic
information, and specifically suggesting revising Rule 34 to permit courts to
distinguish between paper and electronic evidence); Redish, supra note 45, at 626
(declaring that to take account of the use of computers and other electronic data
storage means, the discovery rules need to be substantially modified); The Sedona
Conference, The Sedona Principles: Best Practices Recommendations & Principles for
Addressing Electronic Document Production 2, 6-7 (Mar. 2003), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/publications_html (last visited March 20,
2004) (stating that the working group rejected the argument that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide an adequate framework to address issues
regarding electronic discovery).
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